Efim Sandler is an amazing History on IDF and Conflicts. This is one of the early battles of the IDF. A lot of information here.
SUCCESS ON TOP OF FAILURES
Battle of Um Katef – Abu Ageila, Operation KADESH, 1956
Operation KADESH also known as Sinai War is pretty controversial and many details are hardly known. What can be said that is was the first employment of Armored Corps as attacking force and it actually pretty much shaped the mindset of IDF. During the 8 day campaign the focus of the armored action was placed on the Um Katef/Abu Ageila complex finally taken by November 2, 1956 and by many opinions was a breakpoint of the war in general. Despite common belief armored part of Op KADESH was a set of failures that eventually led to a victory.
On the eve of the Op KADESH IDF forces targeted for breakthrough into Sinai consisted from 38th DIV led by Gen Wallach, that included two armored brigades – 7th and 37th, and two infantry brigades – 10th and 4th. The overall management of the operation was taken by Gen Simhoni, IDF Southern Command CO. The most potent force was 7th (active) Brigade, commanded by Col. Ori Ben-Ari and included 82nd Battalion with three tank companies of total 39 tanks – two of new M50 and one M4A1E8. 9th Armor Battalion with newly arrived 35 AMX-13 tanks in three companies, and 52nd Mechanized Infantry Battalion on halftracks. 7th Brigade was reinforced by 61 Mech Infantry Battalion with halftracks from 16th Brigade. 37th Armor (reserve) Brigade, led by Col. Shmuel Glinka, included 377 Armor Battalion with two companies of Sherman M3 tanks, 266 Battalion with a company of AMX-13 tanks and two mechanized infantry battalions – 278 and 54 (latter attached from 11th Brigade).
On the eve of the 1956 war, Brigadier General Sarni Yassa Boulos, commanded the 6th Infantry Brigade, with responsibility for the defense of Abu Ageila. The Egyptian 6th Infantry Brigade was missing its 16th Infantry Battalion, which general headquarters had withdrawn for service in the Canal area. This move left the 6th Brigade with only two of its organic infantry battalions and the following organization: 17th and 18th Infantry Battalions, 289th Reserve Battalion, 78th Antitank Battery and 94th Antitank Battery (together 22 Archer tank destroyers), 3d Artillery Regiment (16 25-pounders). This force numbered approximately 3,000 men. In addition there were two armored brigades with T-34 and Su-100 reportedly deployed in Bir Gafgaga and Jibel Livneh.
The original plan was to employ IDF ground forces only on D+3 (72 hours) after the opening of hostilities in a ‘limited manner’ aka by airdropping 890 Paratrooper Battalion over the Mitle Pass. The only exception would be taking over Qusmiyah (Kussmiya) by 4th Infantry Brigade, that would serve as a key entry point in case the paratroopers would get into trouble. From the beginning of the action on October 29, IDF command started to spread its armored forces between the units – one company of AMX tanks 9/7 went to 202 Paras acting over the southern route – Quantilla-Bir Tamda. 52nd Battalion was assigned to 4th Brigade that got stuck over Qusmiyah. Here came the major controversy of the operations – the conflict between Moshe Dayan (IDF Chief of Staff) and Brigade General Assaf Simhoni (IDF Southern Command CO). Dayan insisted on holding the ground forces until D+3, while Simhoni did not really get it and believed that moving faster is better. On the other hand, Dayan believed in using armored units as support for infantry, while Simhoni believed in tanks as leading attacking force. Nevertheless 7th Brigade and other ground forces of 38th Division were ordered into Sinai on the night of October 29-30.
After getting over the Qusmiyah, Simhoni ordered Ben Ari to exploit success and move forwards towards Um-Katef. Ben Ari ordered 52 Battalion supported with tank company (assigned from 82 Bn) to get to about 3km distance but not to engage. 52 Bn CO, Uri Rom did not get the order properly and ordered to attack, and ran into precise Archer fire that claimed at least one Sherman. Getting into the spot, Col Ben Ari ordered to stop the attack and retreat. With IDF 7th Brigade already in Sinai, Dayan ordered 10thBrigade to attack Um-Katef and open the route towards Abu Ageila. The order was given without any coordination with 38 Division that led to a disaster. Two 10th Brigade battalions – 104 and 105 both messed up during the night and did not reach their objectives. Dayan ordered 377/37 to move in, led by Brigade CO, Col Glinka. The 37th force included two tank companies and two infantry companies. The tanks lost the direction (or stuck over the dunes) and Col. Glinka decided to perform a frontal attack without tank force. Glinka force entered minefield and was engaged by heavy fire including Archer destroyers. During this attack 37th Brigade lost 20 KIA and 65 WIA including Brigade CO, who later died from wounds in the hospital.
In the early afternoon of the 30th, an important event occurred that proved a turning point in the Israeli attempt to take Abu Ageila. Elements of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade's reconnaissance company discovered that the Daika Pass was unguarded: the Egyptians had blown up a bridge just before the entrance and then had withdrawn deep into the defile. On learning this, one Israeli reconnaissance platoon occupied overwatching positions, while a second platoon moved into the defile. By 1615, the second platoon reached the northern tip of the Daika Pass, within view of Ruafa Dam some ten kilometers to the northeast. There, the platoon commander observed Egyptian trucks rushing supplies into the main defensive perimeter. Despite presenting a ‘golden opportunity’ to get to the Abu Ageila from the rear, the Daika Pass was a pretty tough objective to manage by armored forces, that did not allow to deploy more than two tank platoons in one line. The passage was led by 61 Battalion followed by 82 Battalion (CO Avraham Adan). Egyptians reportedly were surprised and 7th Brigade elements managed to approach 3km distance from Abu Ageila unnoticed but immediately got under artillery and Archer fire. According to one version with attack succeeded in overrunning the stronghold, upon another version the attack has been repelled and Abu Ageila was vacated on November 1 due to Nasser order to pull all army units to repel British and French invasion. Nevertheless by the morning of Oct 31, 7th Brigade elements managed to take over the Abu Ageila Junction, cutting Egyptian 6thBrigade from El-Arish.
On the eve of October 31, Avraham Adans’ 82ndBattalion was ordered to attack Ruafa Dam and performed an ad-hoc attack by two M50 platoons of A Company (CO Moshe Brill), mechanized infantry company, and Shermans of D Company that was taken back from 10th Brigade. Need to mention that the attacking force could mount only 14 tanks as other elements of 82/7 were sent towards El-Arish to block possible Egyptian armor assault (that never materialized). According to the plan, D Company would perform direct fire support for Brill tanks attacking from north-east while infantry will follow the tanks. There were no time for rehearsal as the sun was going down, and the whole plan messed up from the start. Brill tanks started to receive fire and shifted towards south-west getting in between the direct support tanks of D Company. Adan ordered D company to stop firing and join the attack of A Company. Under heavy and precise anti-tank fire most of IDF tanks were hit, only two tanks and one halftrack reached the lines of Ruafa Dam. Mechanized infantry was cut from the leading force by Egyptian tank fire from the direction of El-Arish and Archers from Ruafa Dam stronghold.
From the memories of Lt. Yakov Maya, D Co, 82/7:
“The two companies began to move, Brill parallel to the road, and Sasson (Mech Infantry) on the road. When the force got exposed to the enemy, two of infantry halftracks were hit and destroyed with many casualties. The tanks of Company A also began to be hit. Brill decided to change the direction going south-west instead. One of the platoon leaders was killed. Suddenly I’ve spotted out Operations Officer running towards me and waving to join the attack. One of our platoon leaders was wounded, the tank of another could not start, thus it was only me. On the approach my loader reported that the breach could not be locked – I ordered to get to the MG and fire. Soon he reported the blocked barrel. I ordered the crew to pull out all hand grenades available in the tank. I fired my Uzi and threw grenades at running Egyptians. And there was a huge blow at the tank – and the tank fell on the side over the Egyptian trenches. Fortunately Egyptians left their positions and we managed to get out safely.”
Despite Ruafa base was overrun by Israelis it was not secured – Adan simply had no resources to clean the area and pulled out all forces to Abu Ageila Junction by 10pm. The attack on Ruafa Dam costed 82nd Battalion 14 KIA and about 30 WIA – half or the casualties was mechanized infantry. A and D Companies lost 7 tanks (half of the force) that were hit and knocked out, several others developed technical issues or threw tracks. After receiving reinforcements and supplies Adan mounted another attack on the early morning of November 1. This time it looks that Egyptian forces left the base. According to Israeli report there were 14 Archers, 7 57mm anti-tank guns, 6 25-pdrs and 4 anti-aircraft guns. Egyptian sources mention lesser amount of Archers – 8-10 and that the whole compound was defended by just one company. According to one IDF veteran – “if Adan would have any intel on Ruafa, he would never order such attack.”
On the night of November 1-2, IDF 10th Brigade completed encirclement of Um-Katef stronghold while most IDF units were directed towards Suez Canal. 82/7 remained in blocking position at Abu Ageila Junction to repulse any incoming Egyptian attack. By the morning November 2 IDF entered Um Katef and found it abandoned. On the same day of November 2, 1956, a tragic event occurred when tanks of A Co, 82/7 spotted a company of M3 Shermans of 377 Bn, 37th Brigade, assigned to 10th Brigade. The M3 tanks bypassed Um Katef stronghold and approached 82/7 blocking positions. Moshe Brill misidentified them as Egyptian tanks due to the leading Egyptian jeep captured and reused by Israelis, and ordered fire from 600m. The company was whipped out with 8 (9) tanks destroyed and about 25 dead. The firefight was stopped by a Piper pilot that spotted the error, landed near 82 Bn to report. This was the worst friendly fire accident in the history of IDF Armored Corps.
The Battle of Um Katef/Abu Ageila and Ruafa Dam in particular was taken as first IDF Armored Corps success in leading the attacking force. A Company, 82/7, received Commendation Medal from 7th Brigade CO, while its commander Moshe Brill was awarded Medal of Courage.
Later Moshe Dayan confessed that his interference into the fight and operation in general while confronting Gen Simhoni, and overruling 38 Division Command caused unnecessary casualties without any significant gains. On the other hand Gen Simhoni was not respective to 38 Division Command as well – he pulled 7th Brigade and then 37th Brigade managing them separately, that actually led to the tragic friendly fire on Nov 2.
Need to mention that Op KADESH accounts are pretty loose in details and even messing up the dates. Many events are covered by extensive layer of propaganda, nevertheless here we have more or less clear picture of the events.
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| aptured Archer tank destroyer at Abu Ageila |
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| Engineering assets of 7th Brigade. Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| Col Ori Ben-Ari, during Op KADESH from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| tanks of 82/7 (D Company). Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| 9/7 moving towards Bir el-Hasana. Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| Shermans in Sinai. October 31. 1956 |
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| tanks probably of 37 Brigade, Abu Ageila area. Nov 2, 1956 |
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| M50 tanks of 82/7. 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| Destroyed Egyptian Sherman, Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| AMX tanks of 9/7 at Bir el-Hasana. 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| Victory parade of 7th Brigade, Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| 9/7 moving towards Bir el-Hasana. Sinai 1956 from Ori Ben-Ari archive |
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| captured Egyptian armor after the war, Israel 1957 |
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